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Argumentation is a defining feature of collaborative learning. We investigated 
collaborative case-based learning in order to identify the argumentation scheme which 
learners use in constructing shared explanations over evidence. We observed medical 
students attempting to explain how a judge had arrived at his verdict in a case of 
medical negligence. The students were learning within a virtual learning environment 
and their communication was computer mediated. We examine the dialogue between 
these learners and discover the abductive argumentation scheme which characterises 
it. We also assessed the students’ learning and propose that it is related to particular 
features of the abductive argumentation scheme. 
1. Argumentation and case-based collaborative learning  
Cases are natural objects for collaborative learning, stimulating spontaneous discussion and 
inquiry. A case presents a set of facts bound together within a scenario or narrative containing 
an issue; this issue gives rise to the need for explanation or resolution. In this paper, we make 
use of a legal case of medical negligence where the issue was to explain why the judge had 
arrived at his verdict.  Case-based collaborative learning of this kind has become an 
established part of vocational and professional training, most visibly in law, management and 
medicine. It is also a promising opportunity for the application of learning technologies. 
However designers of learning environments for case-based learning will need to know how 
learners learn through discourse. Design of the resources, tasks, functionalities and 
representations of learning environments all need to be grounded in a cognitive level account 
of the reasoning and related learning processes which characterize case-based learning. For 
example, whether learners consider and compare alternative explanations for a set of 
evidence is a question which has significant implications for designing learning environments 
for case based collaborative learning. The work we report here is a contribution towards 
answering the question of how learners reason and learn in collaborative case based learning 
settings. 
Argumentation is an analytical prism through which to view collaborative learning with cases 
and specifically, the reasons and reasoning embodied in dialogue. It applies to situations in 
which reasoning can lead to different conclusions, but it is not limited to adversarial 
dialogues or disagreements. For example, argumentation occurs when people collaborate on 
some inquiry where they together explore different explanations for some issue. 
Argumentation then, concerns primarily the content of discourse, as well as its rhetorical 
forms. The work we report examines the argumentation in a collaborative case-based learning 
setting. 
Research into argumentation and learning aims to understand “how argumentation produces 
learning, that is, to discover which cognitive mechanisms, triggered by argumentative 
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interactions, generate new knowledge and in which conditions” (Jermann and Dillenbourg, 
2003). Baker has proposed that there may be three general mechanisms through which 
argumentation produces learning (Baker, 2003). First articulating solutions may produce 
knowledge restructuring in a manner equivalent to the self-explanation effect. The discourse 
encourages the elaboration and coherence of arguments which has the effect of testing and 
developing knowledge. The second way is due to the dialectical dimension of the 
argumentation, where the status of arguments is challenged and new beliefs are acquired as 
the result of successful refutations and defenses. Recognising the subtle epistemic shades of a 
proposition will also occur and is part of the development of knowledge. The third way is the 
negotiation of meaning, conceptual dissociation and knowledge elaboration as integral parts 
of the argumentation process. These three suggestions usefully illustrate what the cognitive 
mechanisms referred to by Jermann and Dillenbourg  may look like and the need to explicitly 
capture a relationship between knowledge, learning and argument.  
Our concern is with collaborative case-based learning and the cognitive mechanism through 
which new knowledge is triggered by argumentation. It is likely that case based learning 
involves a characteristic argumentation scheme to which learning will be systematically 
related.  To examine this conjecture we studied a group of medical students engaged in case 
based learning in a virtual learning environment. The students were developing their 
understanding of the law of medical negligence through analyzing a documented case in 
which a General Practitioner (GP) was accused of causing a patient to suffer a stroke. Our 
study sought to examine first, whether an argumentation scheme could be detected in the 
students’ dialogue and second, whether learning could be interpreted from the students’ 
dialogue and associated with the argumentation scheme. 
The approach we adopted to investigating argumentation involved an interpretive knowledge 
analysis of dialogues at the level of individual contributions. This approach has been 
established in earlier work on collaborative learning, for example by Roschelle who 
examined how two students develop a shared understanding of mechanics through working 
together with an interactive simulation of a simple mechanics problem. By examining the use 
of terms and conceptual relationships in individual contributions to the dialogue, individually 
held concepts of ‘lengthening’ and ‘pulling’ are seen to become integrated into the single 
concept of ‘travel along’ (Roschelle, 1992). In our investigation we adopt a similar 
interpretive method for knowledge analysis of dialogue transcripts. 
We first describe the online learning setting we established within our virtual learning 
environment and present data we collected. This includes a complete account of the materials 
used in the study which are essential to understanding the dialogue which the students 
construct between themselves. We then examine the dialogue and classify it against the 
typology of dialogues provided by critical argumentation theorists. We then isolate and 
identify the characteristic form of argumentation scheme in the dialogue, a form which we 
refer to as an abductive argumentation scheme. Finally we attempt to identify whether 
learning outcomes are consistently associated with the argumentation scheme.  
2. Observation of collaborative case-based learning in a distributed environment 
We developed a case-based learning activity in medical law for undergraduate students taking 
a taught module on professional issues for clinicians. The setting for this learning activity 
was a virtual collaborative learning environment (Sirrochi, 2003). The students had already 
attended a lecture on the law of medical negligence and the learning experience we designed 
for our study substituted for the planned class work which would have involved a similar 
face-to-face discussion of cases. Our learning experience was focused on a case in which a 
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general practitioner had been accused of negligence that it was claimed resulted in a patient 
suffering a stroke. This case was adapted for the purposes of our study from the account 
given by Goldberg and targeted the key concepts of negligence: (i) a breach of a duty of care, 
and (ii) actual harm caused by a breach of duty of care (Goldberg, 2000). For present 
purposes we can regard these concepts as equivalent to the lay-concepts of ‘being at fault’ 
and ‘being to blame (for what happened)’. The relationship between these elements is 
potentially complex, and different qualities and forms of causation are possible. It is possible, 
for example, to find that the GP had breached their duty of care and had been negligent in a 
restricted sense, but that the GP was not liable for harm suffered by a patient because their 
negligence could not be said to have caused the harm. 
A single group of three undergraduate medical students participated in this case based 
learning experience. The students were initially given ten minutes to write individual 
accounts of their understanding of the law of medical negligence, including illustrative 
examples of negligence that came to mind. This task was performed online in a separate 
editor window. The students were then introduced to the virtual learning environment which 
included a chat messaging system for communication, a hypertext case library, a shared 
whiteboard, and a display area for presenting the task briefing. Next the students were given 
five minutes to read a short summary (reproduced in Figure 1) of the lecture on medical 
negligence they had attended. The students were then presented with the description of the 
‘Vadera vs Shaw’ case (Figure 2) and were asked to explain the judge’s verdict of ‘negligent 
but not liable’.  
The students were given ten minutes to read the details of the case, they then began their 
discussion. The case details and the lecture resume were available throughout the discussion. 
The record of their dialogue is reproduced in Figure 3 and includes the timestamp of each 
contribution. The order of a small number of contributions (those where the {timestamp} is 
enclosed in brackets) has been changed to make clearer the intended sequence of exchanges, 
a sequence which is typically disrupted by the time-ordered, post-once nature of chat 
systems. After completing their discussion of the case the students were then asked to write 
brief individual accounts of what they believed to be the important issues in the case.  
Given the aim of relating learning to argumentation, we needed to assess what the students 
may have learnt through their discussion of the Vadera case. We therefore adopted the 
approach used by Suthers and Hundhausen in their analysis of dialogues collected in problem 
based collaborative learning sessions (Suthers and Hundhausen, 2003). We produced a 
domain analysis of the Vadera and Shaw case (see Figure 4) in which the case was 
interpreted against the key elements of the law of medical negligence as given in the lecture 
summary. Hence the domain analysis consists of identifying the hypotheses which could be 
developed from the case, the relevant case facts supporting each hypothesis, and the 
explanation which related the facts to the hypothesis. The analysis consists of six hypotheses, 
each with a corresponding explanation, and nine facts in total. The same facts can be 
associated with two competing hypotheses because the explanations given with each of those 
hypotheses allow different interpretations of those facts.  
The hypotheses H2, H3, and H4 are alternative hypotheses, and hypotheses H5 and H6 are 
alternative hypotheses; hypotheses H5 and H6 are dependent on accepting hypothesis 4 and 
rejecting hypotheses H2 and H3. The original verdict of negligent but not liable is therefore 
explained by H1, H4 and H5. In our analysis the facts have only consistent relationships with 
the hypotheses, unlike Suther’s analysis which additionally allowed inconsistent 
relationships. Using this domain analysis as describing an idealized learning outcome, we 
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coded the students’ dialogue for explicit reference to each of the hypotheses. We coded 
references to the hypotheses as they occurred in the dialogue, explicit reference to the set of 
facts contained in the domain model, and articulation of the explanations. 
3. Argumentation type and schema 
We are interested in the reasoning of our students as they sought to explain the judge’s 
verdict. We are examining that reasoning through the analytic prism provided by 
argumentation which allows us to examine the form and content of shared reasoning. 
Argumentation offers a typology of dialogues in relation to the purposes of the discourse, the 
knowledge which the participants possess initially and their initial positions, and the methods 
used in the discourse. Types of dialogue include debate, persuasion, inquiry and negotiation  
dialogues (Walton, 1989). At a lower grain of analysis, argumentation is concerned with the 
form of arguments within distinct episodes within a discourse. Here we first describe the type 
of argument which our students exhibited during the learning experience. This account 
examines the structure of the argumentation at a high level. We then identify the 
argumentation scheme which characterizes the form of reasoning which the students 
exhibited. 
3.1 The dialogue type 
By viewing argumentation as a kind of informal logic, we can see how reasoning advances by 
inferring one proposition on the basis of other propositions. This reasoning is usually within a 
dialectical discourse where alternative interpretations and conclusions are proposed by 
different participants in the dialogue. Argumentation leads the parties in a dialogue to make 
commitments to particular propositions and their store of commitments accumulates through 
the dialogue. In the dialogue the students approach the task of explaining the original verdict 
in the case by discussing what verdict they themselves would have given. The students take 
different points of view on this question at the outset and the ensuing discussion is a series of 
exchanges through which they arrive at a consensus conclusion. The argumentation can be 
identified with two types of dialogue, persuasion dialogues and inquiry dialogues.  
There are distinct features of persuasion in the argumentation as Gemma and Hywel persuade 
David to change his mind and agree that the GP was negligent.  Persuasion arguments arise in 
the competition between two hypotheses and have a characteristic method which is to prove a 
thesis from premises that the other party concedes. David for example concedes the premise 
proposed by Gemma that the GP should have taken further blood pressure readings; David 
then finds himself forced to agree with Gemma’s assertion that the GP was negligent. The 
persuasion argument is asymmetric in this case, because whilst Gemma and Hywel believe 
strongly that the GP was negligent, David does not strongly believe that the GP was not 
negligent; he holds the more neutral view that the GP was merely naïve. David is not 
attempting to negate Gemma’s argument but only to resist and question it and so the 
hypotheses in this argumentation are weakly opposed. 
As the dialogue advances, concessions made by David are used by Gemma and Hywel to 
support their claim that the GP was negligent. Further case facts are introduced by the 
students as the dialogue proceeds and interpreted to support their arguments. For example, in 
Episode 4 Gemma introduces the important fact that it is unknown whether the GP took a 
patient history; by implication the GP did not and therefore ignored a potential source of 
confirmation of the blood pressure reading or of the hypertension diagnosis. David concedes 
this fact which now becomes an additional premise for Gemma’s conclusion that the GP was 
negligent (Hypothesis H4) which David is then forced to tacitly concede.  
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As the dialogue progresses each participant maintains a set of commitments which can be 
seen as a set of distinct propositions to which additions or deletions are made. The set of 
propositions to which each person is making a commitment is visible to the other participants 
in the argument. These propositions are the semantic core of the argument made up of one or 
more conclusions and a set of premises.  
As well as these features of persuasion, the argumentation also exhibits the distinctive 
features of an inquiry. Inquiry arguments have the character of accumulating increments of 
knowledge (Walton, 1989) and typically begin by acknowledging an initial lack of essential 
knowledge; evidence is given the highest priority in inquiry arguments. The three students are 
clearly immersed in such an inquiry as they sift the facts about the GP’s actions and 
judgements and the patient’s state.  
This sifting is an uneven process where the students struggle to assess the relevance and 
significance of the given facts of the case, and to make inferences about the likelihood of 
other implicit facts. The disputed follow-on consultation is a fact which causes the students 
particular difficulty. David goes so far as to suggest in Episode 5 that it was the crux of the 
case and that only if the GP ignored the adverse effects of the prescription would they be 
negligent. The argumentation is enthymematic because it implicitly (but incorrectly) assumes 
that the act of making the prescription in the first place could not have been negligent. It is 
also indicative of the student’s inexperience in dealing with such legal problems that they are 
willing to dwell on the disputed consultation rather than concentrating on the incontrovertible 
facts. 
The facts of the case must be interpreted as premises for the conclusion they are arguing for, 
and the students struggle to recognise the important premises into which the facts can be 
fitted. A decisive argument is made by Gemma in Episode 6 when she proposes that the GP’s 
liability turns on whether the patient would have suffered the stroke if she hadn’t been given 
the prescription. The decisiveness of this counter-factual argument is accepted and the given 
statistical evidence about the link between the pill and strokes is then easily fitted into the 
developing argument, producing the conclusion that the GP could not be shown to be liable.  
Participants in inquiry arguments adopt a characteristically neutral attitude towards the 
possible hypotheses and their dialogue is cooperative rather than adversarial (Walton, 1989). 
The three students’ clearly do not adopt neutral attitudes towards the alternative hypotheses, 
owing to the components of persuasion it contains as already discussed. However the 
dialogue is highly cooperative. 
In sum we are able to identify the essential argumentation elements of the student’s dialogue 
in relation to its purpose and technique. We are also able to associate the argumentation with 
Walton’s typology. We now go further into the argumentation analysis to identify the 
characteristic argumentation scheme which the students deploy. 
3.2. The argumentation scheme  
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical inferential structures of arguments within discourse. 
Recurring forms of argument were first identified in the form of fallacies, such as the ad 
hominem fallacy in which an argument attacks the person rather than what they are saying. 
Another example is the ‘slippery slope’ argument where conceding one proposition 
inevitably leads to conceding others and accepting an unacceptable conclusion. Whereas 
these ancient ideas of argument structure were limited to reasoning which was faulty in some 
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way, Walton has shown that argumentation schemes can be found in discourse more 
generally, and one which is particularly significant is the abductive scheme.  
The abductive argumentation scheme describes the synthetical hypothesis about causes. It 
applies to situations where an explanation needs to be formed and where different 
explanations are possible; abduction is sometimes referred to as ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ (Honderich, 1995). Josephson and Josephson (1996) argue that much reasoning 
in ordinary life, in science, in medicine and in law is abductive; they express agreement with 
Charniak’s view that the two primary functions of cognition are abduction and planning. 
Magnani (1992), citing Simon (1965, 1977) also comments “I completely agree with Simon: 
abduction is the main subject of problem solving, and developments in the fields of cognitive 
science and artificial intelligence have strengthened this conviction”. 
Abductive reasoning is intrinsically creative, forming partial knowledge into more complete 
and general knowledge. Pierce, the logician philosopher credited with identifying abductive 
reasoning said of abductive inference that it “comes to us like a flash… it is the idea of 
putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new 
suggestion before our contemplations” (Pierce 1997). Abduction therefore holds considerable 
promise as an account of how learning arises from explanation and problem solving. Pierce 
wrote that it must be by abductive reasoning “… that we have the capacity to learn anything 
at all”. 
Abductive reasoning gets its name from the way in which explanations are driven by (i.e., 
lead by) the data. It is reasoning from some given or observable effects to antecedent causes, 
and this marks the contrast with deductive reasoning. Unlike deduction which is a necessary 
and truth preserving form of inference (if you accept the premises of a deductive argument, 
you must accept the conclusion), abduction may only produce conclusions which are a 
current best guess: the explanations it generates (ie, the conclusions about antecedent causes) 
are the most likely explanation for the given event given the information currently available. 
Abductive inferences are probabilistic kind of reasoning, as are inductive inferences. 
However induction is essentially restricted to classifying the data or premises of arguments 
(e.g., tradititonally whether these or those swans are white), whereas abduction explains the 
causal relations between the facts. The form of abductive inference has been described by 
Josephson and Josephson (1996) as 
D is a collection of data (facts, observations, givens),  
H explains D (would, if true, explain D),  
No other hypothesis explains D as well as H does.  
Therefore, H is probably correct. 
Our students can be seen to exhibit this form of reasoning about the verdict in the Vadera vs 
Shaw case. The first hypothesis advocated by the students corresponds with H3 in the domain 
analysis, the hypothesis that the general practitioner was careless but not professionally 
negligent. The single fact offered in relation to this explanation was the GP interpreting the 
unusually high blood pressure reading as anomalous. As additional facts are considered, this 
hypothesis becomes less sustainable as the best explanation, for example, the fact that the 
normal protocol would have been to take additional readings of blood pressure. A new 
hypothesis (H4), that the GP was negligent is considered, and is tentatively and rather tacitly 
agreed in Episode 4 of the dialogue. Up to this point the participants were distinguishing 
carelessness from negligence (some forms of carelessness will not be judged to be negligent, 
if they do not breach a duty of care and or there is no actual harm caused to a patient). The 
dialogue moves then (Episode 5) to consider the additional hypothesis (H5) about the ‘not 
 7 
liable’ part of the verdict. The first fact selected in relation to this hypothesis concerns the 
disputed consultation at which the GP is alleged to not have withdrawn the prescription. This 
fact properly relates to the GP’s negligence and not their liability; the fact has not been 
included in the domain analysis because the fact is itself disputed in the case. Episode 6 
continues the reasoning about the GP’s liability and Gemma correctly identifies part of the 
explanation within this hypothesis, the question about what would have happened in the 
absence of the prescription. Hywel provides the additional fact about the statistical evidence 
to support Gemma’s counterfactual explanation for hypothesis H5. He fails to recognize that 
the absence of a statistical relationship between the pill and strokes in general still allows the 
possibility that Ms Vadera was within a sub-population of hypertensives for whom there is a 
statistical relationship which would then imply the opposite hypothesis, H6, that the GP was 
liable. In her summing up in Episode 10, Gemma adopts Hywel’s this flawed argument for 
fact F8 supporting hypothesis H5. 
Walton 2005 emphasizes the discursive context of abductive reasoning in which explanation 
is driven by the need to find answers to successive questions. He says: "the structural 
correctness of an abductive inference depends on the transfer of understanding from one 
party to another in a dialogue. The best explanation is one that increases the understanding of 
a questioner as that individual moves forward through a search process. Of course, what 
increases understanding depends on the nature of the investigation...An abductive argument 
that is put forward by a proponent and meets the requirements for the scheme is to be 
evaluated in a given case with respect to how a respondent's critical questions are answered in 
a dialogue" (ibid p. 206). Walton is arguing that abductive reasoning needs to be regarded as 
a process as much as a conclusion and at a larger scale than individual inferences. The limited 
success of attempts to compare abductive, inductive and deductive reasoning are in part 
because of their focus on single inferences.  As a process on a larger scale, Walton (2005) 
identifies four phases of abductive reasoning: dialogue setting, formation of explanation 
attempts, evaluation of explanations, and dialogue closure. These phases are evident in the 
students’ dialogue. Explanations constructed are tested for their adequacy in explaining all 
the facts identified as relevant, and they are also assessed relative to the alternative 
explanations. The dialogue closure, which continues through Episodes 7 to 9, is lead by 
David who attempts a summing up of their argumentation around the distinct decision stages 
of the Bolam test. This summing up is unsuccessful either as reflecting the discussion that has 
been had, or indeed the elements of the verdict. The students agree on a conclusion based on 
the erroneous use of the statistical evidence. 
3.3. Learning 
The domain analysis (Figure 4) is a normative interpretation of the Vadera case (Figure 2) 
obtained by applying the essential concepts contained in the summary of the medical law of 
negligence (Figure 1). The original verdict in the case is explained by hypotheses H1, H4 and 
H5 in the domain analysis. The domain analysis can also be regarded as a statement of 
idealized learning outcomes for the Vadera case learning experience. If the students’ 
concluded these three hypotheses, including the corresponding explanation and relevant facts, 
then it is reasonable to assume that they have also acquired the essential concepts of the law 
of medical negligence embodied in those hypotheses, and specifically, the conceptual 
distinction targeted between negligence (breaching a duty of care) from the concept of 
liability (responsibility for actual harm caused by a breach). 
We can therefore identify statements in the dialogue which are evidence of the use of 
acquired concepts. Figure 5 summarises the analysis of the semantic core of the dialogue by 
comparing the student argumentation against the domain analysis. The table summarises 
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which elements of the domain analysis were identified in the student argumentation. For 
example, the argumentation explicitly refers to Hypothesis H1 but neither the explanation for 
that hypothesis (E1) nor the relevant fact (F1) were explicitly stated (David correctly states in 
Episode 8 that there was no doubt about the hypothesis that the GP had a duty of care). This 
summarization makes clear the incompleteness of the students’ argumentation Two 
hypotheses are not discussed at all, the facts associated with each hypothesis are only 
partially identified and only one explanation for a hypothesis is explicitly contributed. 
The students definitively conclude on H5, although they identify just one fact as relevant to 
this hypothesis and they only identify part of the explanation connecting the relevant facts to 
this hypothesis. In Episode 8, where the students sum up their collective conclusions, the 
issue of whether a duty of care was breached is again confounded (this time by Hywel) with 
the issue of whether the alleged breach caused the stroke. This confusion is left uncorrected 
and as a result it is ambiguous whether the students are adopting hypothesis H4 (the GP was 
negligent) or adopting a new hypothesis H2 (the GP was without fault). The failure to resolve 
the confusion can be interpreted as a weak dissociation of the concepts of negligence and 
liability.   
In individual reports written immediately following the learning experience, each of the 
students does indicate a grasp of the distinction between negligence and liability. The 
responses, shown in Figure 6, indicate a separate consideration of the acceptability of the 
GP’s actions and the causation for the harm suffered by the patient.  
These post-session responses need to be interpreted against responses given before the start 
of the learning session when the students were asked to write a short account of their 
knowledge of the law relating to medical negligence. At that point only David explicitly 
distinguished the issue of assessing a GP’s professional behaviour separately from the issue 
of responsibility for harm suffered by a patient which might have been caused by that 
behaviour. Gemma and Hywel acquire this dissociation through exposure to the Vadera/Shaw 
verdict, as consideration of the set of facts is broadened and as one hypothesis is abandoned 
in favour of another which more successfully accounts for the facts.  
The students then have grasped the abstract distinction between negligence and liability but 
their operationalisation of it within the Vadera case is relatively weak. Note in Episode 5 the 
way in which David implies that the key issue in deciding the GP’s liability was whether she 
had ignored contra-indications to the prescription at a follow-on consultation. By implication, 
David falsely believes that a GP could not be liable simply for making a prescription to a 
patient. Gemma then moves the discussion on to establish the counter-factual argument 
which will decide the matter. David acknowledges immediately the correctness of Gemma’s 
argument as the central issue in deciding the GP’s liability and abandons his own flawed 
argument. David is learning to operationalise his concept of liability through the interaction. 
This acquisition of new knowledge about medical negligence appears to be shaped by the 
abductive argumentation scheme. A tentative hypothesis is abandoned as new facts are 
considered, and a new hypothesis is tentatively accepted. As one hypothesis succeeds 
another, the conceptual differences underlying those hypotheses are exposed and produce a 
dissociation which we recognize as learning. 
4: Review 
Our aim was to identify the cognitive mechanism through which learning arises from 
argumentation in collaborative case-based learning. This aim follows from Jermann and 
Dillenbourg’s description of the primary scientific issue facing research in argumentation and 
 9 
learning technologies. We wanted to identify the argumentation scheme which characterizes 
the reasoning which is intrinsic to collaborative case-based learning. Argumentation schemes 
are stereotypical domain-specific forms of reasoning.  We collected a dialogue from three 
medical students learning about medical law with a case of medical negligence. This case 
material differs markedly from the structured and closed problems (e.g, applied mechanics 
problems involving static bodies) often used in collaborative problem-based learning research 
and we believe it is more representative of the kinds of domain (complex, partially structured, 
open) for which case-based collaborative learning is suited. The students were working 
within a distributed virtual learning environment developed for the purpose with materials 
developed to enable scrutiny of the particular conceptual distinction between negligence and 
liability. We found that the students’ dialogue conformed had features of both persuasion and 
inquiry dialogues. The argumentation scheme evident in the dialogue was of the abductive 
type, sometimes referred to as ‘inference to the best explanation’. The effectiveness of the 
learning experience was mixed. The students grasped the distinction between negligence and 
liability but their operationalisation of it, that is, their ability to interpret the concepts for the 
particular facts of the Vadera case, is weak. Nevertheless, the acquisition of the central 
conceptual distinction appears to arise through the abductive process of exploring successive 
explanations to fit a broadening consideration of the case facts. 
Our focus on the essential relationship between argumentation and learning in collaborative 
case-based learning has necessarily led us to make several assumptions and exclude some 
interesting related questions. We have, for example, not examined here the effect on 
argumentation of the computer mediated communication which our students experienced. We 
believe that identifying the argumentation scheme of case based learning is a needed prior 
task for the research and once achieved can make the investigation of the technology and 
process factors more focused and rapid. We have also treated argumentation as the collective 
reasoning of the group and avoided the dispute over fundamentals concerning how 
collaboration contributes to learning more generally. Collaborative learning has been 
described as essentially a process of convergence in which the participants develop a shared 
solution by integrating their different understandings of underlying concepts (Roschelle, 
1992). Yet it has also been described as a process where each participant separately revises 
their understanding of underlying concepts using the exchanges with others as stepping 
stones, even while the solution to the problem is being expressed collectively and with 
collective agreement (Shirouzu and Miyake, 2002). Our approach allows progress on 
investigating collaborative case based learning without committing to either position and may 
in fact help reframe those positions enabling more rapid progress on the questions of the 
relationships between argumentation, learning and learning technologies.  
We acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council, award no. L328 
25 3013 
References 
Baker M. (2003) Computer-mediated argumentative interactions for the co-elaboration of scientific notions. In 
Andriessen J., Baker M. and Suthers D. (ed.s) Arguing to learn. Kluwer Academic: Netherlands. 
Jermann P. & Dillenbourg P. (2003) Elaborating new arguments through a CSCL script. In Andriessen J., Baker 
M. and Suthers D. (ed.s) Arguing to learn. Kluwer Academic: Netherlands. 
Goldberg, R. (2000) The Contraceptive Pill, Negligence and Causation: Views on Vadera v. Shaw, The Medical 
Law Review, volume 8, pages 316-338 
Honderich, T. (ed.) (1995). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 
 10 
Josephson, J. R. & Josephson, S. G. (1996) Abductive Inference,  Computation, Philosophy, Technology, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Koschmann  T. (2003) CSCL, argumentation and deweyan inquiry. In Andriessen J., Baker M. and Suthers D. 
(ed.s) Arguing to learn. Kluwer Academic: Netherlands. 
Magnani, L. (1992) Abductive Reasoning: Philosophical and Educational Perspective on Medicine.  In D. A. 
Evan, & V. L. Patel (Eds.), Advanced Models of Cognition in Medical Training and Practice, Berlin, 
Springer. 
Peirce, C. S. (1997) Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking. In Patricia Ann Turrisi (Ed.), The 
1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, State University of New York Press, Albany. 
Roschelle, J. (1992) Learning by collaborating: Convergent conceptual change.  The Journal of the Learning 
Sciences, v2(3), 235-276. 
Shirouzu H. and Miyake N. (2002) Learning by collaborating revisted: individualistic vs convergent 
understanding. Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, USA, 
1039. 
Sirocchi F., (2003) Integration of an interaction tool for synchronous collaboration into a web based learning 
management system. In Proceedings of IPSI 2003, International Conference on Advances in the 
Internet, Sveti Stefan, Montenegro, 4 October 2003. 
Simon, H. A. (1965) The Logic of Rational Decision, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v16, 169-
186. 
Simon, H. A. (1977) Models of Discovery and Other Topics in the Methods of Science. Dordrecht, Reidel. 
Suthers D.D. & Hundhausen C.D. (2003) An Experimental Study of the Effects of Representational Guidance 
on Collaborative Learning Processes, Journal of the Learning Sciences, 2003, Vol. 12, No. 2, Pages 
183-21 
Walton D. (1989) Informal logic: a handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge University Press. 
Walton D. (2005) Abductive Reasoning. Alabama University Press. 
 
  
Learning by arguing about evidence and explanations 
 1 
Figure 1  Summary of the law of medical negligence given to the students before the case 
discussions. The summary contains the main points from a lecture the students had 
previously attended. 
Lawyers use the general idea of ‘a duty of care’ which means that everyone has a 
duty to avoid harming others. Doctors are seen as having a special duty of care 
towards patients by virtue of the general and specialist medical skills which they 
possess. 
 
If a doctor behaves in a way which is not professionally responsible, then he may fail 
to maintain the duty of care he has for a patient, and he may then be judged to be 
negligent. Being negligent may involve following some form of action, or failing to 
follow some form of action. 
 
Lawyers make a distinction between negligence and liability:  you may be judged to 
be negligent but not liable for what happened to a patient.  To be liable for the 
consequences of their negligent actions, it would have to be shown that if the doctor 
had not acted in a certain way then the harm would not have taken place. However, if 
the doctor couldn’t have been expected to see the outcome because it was too 
unlikely or too remote from the situation he was in, then even if harm resulted, he 
wouldn’t be held responsible. 
 
So how can we assess (i) whether the professional behaviour of the doctor was 
irresponsible, (ii) whether the damage which resulted from this irresponsible 
behaviour was really down to him/her?  This is decided by a body of experts who 
must establish what would be the expected standard of practice in the given situation 
and whether that standard was met by the actions of the doctor.  
 
Figure 2. Description of the Vadera vs Shaw case.  
A 22-year old asian woman presented herself 3 times within a year at her GP’s 
practice, with the intention of starting contraception before her marriage. She was to 
be married on 30th of November and was eager to start the contraception. She was 
warned that there were health risks associated with contraceptive pills. On the third 
visit, on 11th of October, her blood pressure was taken and it was at 150/100 (higher 
than normal for a woman of her age). This high reading was taken by the GP (Dr. 
Shaw) as a symptom of ‘white-coat hypertension’, a phenomenon caused by anxiety 
of being a doctor’s presence that can however also be indicative of a general 
tendency to hypertension. The next day, she started the pill. She claims that within 3 
weeks she returned to the GP complaining about headaches and feeling generally ill. 
She says the GP prescribed a medication for the headache. The GP claims this 
meeting did not take place and records of any meetings that occurred during this 
period were no longer available. A week later, the plaintiff was admitted to hospital 
suffering from numbness and difficulty in walking. Her blood pressure was read 
several times and was variously found to be at 170/110, 110/60 and 140/110. She 
was diagnosed as having suffered a stroke. 
 
Note: the statistical evidence does not link taking contraceptives with stroke, over the 
population as a whole. 
 
   Verdict: in the first instance the judge found the GP to be negligent but not liable. 
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Figure 3: the dialogue 
 
timestamp 
(hr:min:sec) 
Student 
 DA  
EPISODE1   
14:22:24 
David 
So our task is to justify the 
verdict? 
 
14:22:36 
Hywel 
yes. let's do it!  
14:22:38 
Gemma 
Ok  
14:23:07 
David 
The fact  is im not sure taht i 
actually agree with it 
 
14:23:07 
Gemma 
first, does anyone completely 
disagree with the verdict?" 
 
14:23:12 
David 
*.   
14:23:15 
Gemma 
ok...  
EPISODE2   
14:23:40 
Gemma 
What do u think about it david?  
14:23:45 
David 
maybe the GP was a bit naive with 
teh white coat business 
H3 
14:23:56 
David 
i mean 150/100? F3 
14:24:05 
Gemma 
so u would think that she is liable? H4 
14:24:28 
David 
i would tend to say no  
14:24:39 
David 
but I  am evidently wrong here  
14:24:55 
Gemma 
i don't think I'm understanding u?  
14:25:14 
Gemma 
which part of the verdict would u 
tend to disagree with? 
 
14:25:35 
David 
well, i think the GP was maybe a 
little naive to say that such a high 
BP was white coat hypertension 
H3 
F3 
{14:25:55} 
Gemma 
Yep i think i could agree with u 
there... 
 
14:25:46 
David 
but i think it was a fair diagnosis H3 
14:26:11 
Gemma 
so u think she was right in 
prescribing the pill anyway? 
F5 
EPISODE3   
14:26:18 
Hywel 
shouldn't he have repeated the 
test again at another time 
F4 
14:26:21 Potentially  
David 
14:26:28 
Gemma 
Yeh thats what i though  
EPISODE4   
14:26:37 
David 
maybe she would have been better 
off taking repeated BP's, maybe at 
home? 
F4 
{14:26:51} 
David 
somewhere where the element of 
the doctors presence was reduced 
F4 
14:26:41 
Hywel 
so he  was negligent- he behaved 
irresponsibly 
H4 
14:26:59 
David 
Or did he?  
{14:26:40} 
Gemma 
And we don't know what kind of 
history the GP took 
F4 
14:27:08 
David 
True  
14:27:12 
Hywel 
i agree  
EPISODE5   
14:27:35 
Hywel 
what about the not libale part? H5 
14:27:42 
David 
I think that the crux here is 
whether the second meeting took 
place 
 
14:28:01 
Gemma 
Yeh  
{14:28:11} 
David 
if it did, and the GP fobbed her 
off, then definate case for 
negligance, not having followed up 
the symptoms etc. 
 
 
{14:28:36} 
David 
but, if not then the GP wasnt to 
know about any adverse affects 
experienced 
 
14:28:08 
Hywel 
what responsibility does the doctor 
have for keeping the records safe? 
 
14:28:30 
Gemma 
yeh what about at the pharmacy, 
wouldn't there be a record of the 
prescription there? 
 
EPISODE6   
14:29:26 
Gemma 
really the question is, would she 
have suffered the stroke if she 
hadn't been on the pill? 
H5 E5 
{14:29:33} 
David 
Indeed  
{14:29:41} 
Hywel 
apparently not- statistically anyway F8 
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EPISODE7   
14:29:28 
David 
so on Bolam negligance1  
14:29:40 
David 
there was abviously a duty of care H1 
14:30:02 
Hywel 
what's bolam negligence?  
14:30:14 
David 
The three poibnt negligance test  
{14:30:28} 
David 
duty of care, breach of duty, and 
harm caused by breach 
 
14:30:26 
Gemma 
basically if u have a room full of 
doctors and the majority agrees 
with what u did then u r ok :) 
 
14:30:38 
David 
Well sadi!  
14:30:42 
David 
Said*  
EPISODE8   
14:31:21 
David 
so are we suggesting that the GP 
was not guilty of breach of duty? 
H2/3 
14:31:24 
Hywel 
so if he took the same action as 
any other doctor would have (which 
the facts show that he did) he is 
not liable 
H5 
F6 
EPISODE9   
14:31:40 
Gemma 
i say that because of the lack of 
statistical evidence linking the pill 
with stroke that the verdict is 
justified 
H5  
F8 
14:31:40 
David 
Agreed  
14:31:48 
Hywel 
Agreed  
 
                                                 
Bolam negligence is the principle that a panel of 
experts should decide whether a doctor’s actions 
have fallen below the expected standard. 
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Figure 4.  Domain analysis (DA) of the Vadera vs Shaw case  
 
Hypothesis H1. The GP had a duty of care to Vadera 
Explanation: Because GPs have a duty of care to their registered patients 
Relevant facts: F1. 
Hypothesis H2 The GP did not breach her duty of care to the patient.  
Explanation: Because it was reasonable for the GP to assume that the bp 
reading was anomalous for such a young patient. Any other GP of ‘the 
same skill’ would have made the same judgement. 
 Relevant facts: F2; F3.  
Hypothesis H3 The GP was careless but did not breach her duty of care to 
the patient 
Explanation: Because the GP should have checked the reliability of the bp 
reading  
Relevant facts: F2; F3; F4 
Hypothesis H4. The GP breached her duty of care to the patient: 
Explanation: Because the GP prescribed the pill to Ms Vadera who was 
most likely suffering from hypertension.  
Relevant facts: F3; F4; F5; F6; F7 
Hypothesis H5. The GP was not liable for Vadera’s stroke 
Explanation: Because the patient was likely to have been hypertensive and 
her hypertension was the cause of her stroke. Her original bp reading and 
those taken in the hospital are evidence of hypertension. She would not 
have suffered a stroke if she had not been hypertensive. The prescription 
may have had a contributory effect, but it is possible and even probable 
that Vadera would have suffered a stroke without the prescription. 
Relevant facts: F8; F9 
Hypothesis H6. The GP was liable for Vadera’s stroke 
Explanation: The statistical evidence covers the population in general but 
for hypertensive women there may be an effect of the pill on the 
prevalence of strokes. Ms Vadera was hypertensive, as indicated by the bp 
readings recorded for her before and after the stroke.  The prescription of 
the pill had a significant role in causing the stroke. The GP’s negligence in 
not identifying Ms Vadera’s hypertension led to the actual harm she 
suffered. 
Relevant facts: F8; F9 
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Facts 
F1. Vadera was a registered patient with the GP 
F2. The patient was young  
F3. bp readings can sometimes be anomalous due to ‘white coat 
syndrome’ (anxiety in the presence of a doctor)  
F4 The GP did not confirm the bp readings. 
F5 The GP prescribed the pill without confirming the bp reading. 
F6 The GP did not follow the protocol for screening patients before 
prescribing the pill 
F7 The GP did not investigate further whether the patient had hypertension 
which needed to be treated. 
F8. Statistics show, over the population at large, no effect of the pill on the 
likelihood of suffering a stroke. 
F9. The very high bp readings taken at the hospital indicate that Ms Vadera 
was hypertensive. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Assessment of learning outcomes   
 
Domain analysis (normative) of the 
Vadera-Shaw case 
Explicitly present in 
student argumentation 
H1. 
E1.  
F1 
H1 
H2  
E2  
F2; F3. 
 
H3  
E3   
F2; F3; F4 
H3 
 
F3 
H4  
E3  
F3; F4; F5; F6; F7 
H4 
  
F4 F5 
H5.  
E5  
F8; F9 
H5  
E5  
F6 F8 
H6.  
E6  
F8; F9 
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Figure 6. Following the learning session, individual written responses to the question 
‘what were the main issues in the scenario?’  
 
David “The marriage of the woman in question. 
 The issue of the pill to hypertensive women. 
 The duty of a doctor to ensure a diagnosis is correct (white coat e.g) 
 Follow up appointments by GP’s 
 Negligence being possible without liability” 
  
Gemma “Whether the GP would have passed or failed the Bolam test. 
 Whether or not the pill prescribed caused (or contributed to the cause) the patient to have a stroke” 
  
Hywel “Whether it was appropriate to attribute the hypertention to white coat syndrome 
 The problem that the patients’ medical notes are missing 
 As the statistical evidence finds no connection between taking the pill and suffering a stroke it is not possibl   
attribute the doctor’s actions to the patient suffering a stroke” 
 
 
